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CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE-HOMICIDE--EVIDENCE

OF

DANGEROUS

CHARACTER AND PRIOR THREATS-In a prosecution for homicide the
defendant relied on self defense. The trial judge excluded evidence as to the dangerous character of the deceased and as to
two previous attempts upon the life of the defendant by the deceased on the ground that no "overt act" was shown to have
been committed by the latter. On appeal, affirmed: (1) an overt
act is a hostile demonstration of such a character as to create in
the mind of a reasonable person the belief that he is in immediate danger of losing his life or suffering bodily harm;1 (2) the
proof of such hostile demonstration must be made to the satisfaction of the trial judge subject to the review of the Supreme
Court before the evidence is admissible. 2 State v. Stracner, 190
La. 457, 187 So. 571 (1938).t
Ordinarily in a trial for homicide evidence of prior threats
or the dangerous character of the deceased are inadmissible.8
However, if the defendant claims the killing was in self defense,
it becomes incumbent on him to satisfy the jury that he acted
in a reasonable belief that he was in imminent danger of life or
limb at the time he perpetrated the homicide. Hence his knowledge of the dangerous character of the deceased or threats on
the defendant's life made by him and communicated to the latter
are admissible for this purpose.4 Furthermore in some jurisdictions, though the defendant had no knowledge of such facts, evidence thereof is admissible for the purpose of determining
whether the deceased or the accused was the aggressor.8
t See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1937-1938 Term
(1939) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 314, 383.

1. Accord: State v. Brown, 172 La. 121, 133 So. 383 (1931); State v. Jones,
175 La. 1066, 145 So. 9 (1932).
2. Accord: State v. Brown, 172 La. 121, 133 So. 383 (1931); State v. Scarbrock, 176 La. 48, 145 So. 264 (1932); State v. Boudreaux, 185 La. 434, 169
So. 459 (1936).
3. Wharton, Criminal Evidence (11 ed. 1935) § 339.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid. This exception has not been made in Louisiana generally, yet
some few early cases held that such evidence was admissible to show who
was the aggressor. State v. Robinson, 52 La. Ann. 616, 27 So. 124 (1900);
State v. Lindsay, 122 La. 375, 47 So. 687 (1908); State v. Barksdale, 122 La.
788, 48 So. 264 (1909).
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NOTES

In most jurisdictions the defendant must introduce some
proof of an overt aggressive act or hostile demonstration by the
deceased before evidence of prior threats or the dangerous character of the deceased is admissible.6 In the early Louisiana cases
there was much conflict as to whether this preliminary proof was
necessary.! However, the general rule above was adopted in 1928
by the legislature and incorporated in the Code of Criminal
Procedure."
The purpose of the rule is to prevent the jury from becoming
prejudiced in the defendant's favor where no situation which
could even remotely be termed "self-defensive" is presented by
the evidence. By requiring preliminary proof of an overt act,
the court demands some guarantee that the evidence will be
employed for its proper purpose. The court has apparently lost
sight of the reason for the rule and has interpreted the term
''overt act" in the article as a hostile demonstration of such a
nature as to create in the mind of a reasonable person the belief
that he is in immediate danger of losing his life or suffering
bodily harm." Chief Justice O'Niell has repeatedly attacked this
interpretation. He points out that the "overt act" which according
to this view would be necessary as a foundation for the introduction of this type of evidence is the same "overt act" which
makes out self defense.' 0 Therefore, after the required foundation
6. Some courts have adapted the broad limitation that "other evidence"
which serves to bring self defense fairly to issue must be given first, while
others require some "appreciable evidence" of acts on the part of the deceased. 1 Wigmore, Evidence (2 ed. 1923) § 246.
7. In the following cases evidence of prior threats and dangerous character was admitted and no mention was made of the necessity of the proof of
an "overt act" on the part of the deceased: State v. Cooper, 32 La. Ann. 1084
(1880); State v. Ricks, 32 La. Ann. 1098 (1880); State v. McNeely, 34 La. Ann.
1022 (1882). In other cases the court held such evidence was admissible to
prove who was the aggressor: State v. Robinson, 52 La. Ann. 616, 27 So. 124
(1900) ; State v. Rideau, 116 La. 245, 40 So. 691 (1906) ; State v. Lindsay, 122 La.
375, 47 So. 687 (1908).
In State v. Pairs, 145 La. 443, 82 So. 407 (1919), threats were admitted
to corroborate evidence for the defendant that the accused provoked the
difficulty. On rehearing the court found that there was sufficient evidence of
"overt act." In the next case to come before the court, State v. Sandiford,
149 La. 933, 90 So. 261 (1921), the court held that such evidence was inadmissible without showing of hostile demonstration on the part of the deceased. This was affirmed on rehearing.
8. Art. 482, La. Code of Criminal Procedure: "In absence of proof of
hostile demonstration or overt act on the part of the person slain or injured, evidence of his dangerous character or of his threats against the
accused is not admissible."
9. State v. Brown, 172 La. 121, 133 So. 383 (1931); State v. Jones, 175 La.
1066, 145 So. 9 (1932); State v. Maine, 183 La. 499, 164 So. 321 (1935); State
v. Stracner, 190 La. 457, 182 So. 571 (1938).
10. Chief Justice O'Niell has also attacked the constitutionality of the
rule. He argues very strongly that it violates Art. 7, § 10 of La. Constitution
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is laid the evidence serves no purpose, because the defendant has
already proved that he acted in self defense.1
The question of whether a particular hostile demonstration
was of such a nature as to place the defendant in a reasonable
fear of immediate death or bodily injury is one which must be
determined by the jury. Thus the inquiry is directed to the situation as it appeared to the defendant at the time of the killing.
Evidence of prior threats by the deceased which are known to
the defendant, or evidence of his bad character, is important only
in determining the reasonableness of the defendant's belief that
the defensive measures were necessary. If this has already been
established by other testimony, proof of prior threats and dangerous character of the assailant would be superfluous. Hence,
this evidence is excluded by the Louisiana courts in the only situation in which it could be of real value to the defendant. A better
rule requires proof of some overt aggressive act as a condition
precedent; however, the hostile demonstration need not be one
which, taken alone, would reasonably warrant extreme defensive
measures.' 2
H.W.

EVIDENCE-TESTIMONY OF PHYSICIANS AS TO MENTAL CAPACITY

-Eleven months after conveying his farm to defendant, the
grantor was pronounced incapable of caring for his estate because of old age and physical infirmities. He was not found to be
insane. His conservator sought to set aside the conveyance, contending that the grantor was mentally incompetent when it was
made. Physicians and laymen who were acquainted with the
of 1921, which states:

"The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

shall also extend to criminal cases on questions of law alone . . ." Art. 19,
§ 9 states: ". . . The jury in all criminal cases shall be the judges of the
law and of the facts on the question of guilt or innocence, having been
charged as to the law applicable to the case by the presiding judge." He
argues that where the defendant invokes a plea of self-defense, the question

of whether the deceased was the aggressor in the fatal difficulty is a question of fact upon which the guilt or innocence of the defendant depends,
and that proof of prior threats are admissible only for the purpose of showing who was the aggressor when the question is in doubt, and to allow the
judge to withdraw that question from the jury and decide it is in violation
of Art. 19, § 9; and for the Supreme Court to review such a decision is in

violation of Art. 7, § 10. The courts have refused to hold this a question of
law. State v. Sandiford, 149 La. 933, 90 So. 261 (1921); State v. Brown, 172 La.
121, 133 So. 383 (1932); State v. Stracner, 190 La. 457, 182 So. 571 (1938).
11. For example, in State v. Williams, 46 La. Ann. 709, 711, 15 So. 82, 83

(1894), the court said: "In order to constitute the overt act that would justify
the taking of human life there must be some demonstration made by the

deceased against the accused of such a character as to impress upon him
that he was in imminent danger of his life or some great bodily harm."

12. State v. Padula, 106 Conn. 54, 138 Atl. 456 (1927).

